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We study a production economy with multiple sectors financed by issuing securities to agents who
face capital constraints. Binding capital constraints propagate business cycles, and a reduction of the
interest rate can increase the required return of high-haircut assets since it can increase the shadow
cost of capital for constrained agents. The required return can be lowered by easing funding constraints
through lowering haircuts. To assess empirically the power of the haircut tool, we study the introduction
of the legacy Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). By considering unpredictable rejections
of bonds from TALF, we estimate that haircuts had a significant effect on prices. Further, unique survey
evidence suggests that lowering haircuts could reduce required returns by more than 3% and provides
broader evidence on the demand sensitivity to haircuts.
Adam Ashcraft
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
adam.ashcraft@ny.frb.org
Nicolae Gârleanu
Haas School of Business
F628






44 West Fouth Street
Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012
and NBER
lpederse@stern.nyu.edu\If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary
times is reckoned a good security { on what is then commonly pledged and easily
convertible { the alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed."
| Bagehot (1873), p. 198.
Financial institutions play a key role as credit providers in the economy, and liquidity
crises arise when they become credit constrained themselves. In such liquidity crises, nancial
institutions' ability to borrow against their securities plays a key role, as Bagehot points out.
In the private markets, it can become virtually impossible to borrow against certain illiquid
securities, and, more broadly, the \haircuts" (also called \margin requirements") on many
securities increase in crises.1 Furthermore, security prices may drop signicantly, especially
for securities with high haircuts. To alleviate the nancial institutions' funding problems,
and their repercussions on the real economy, central banks have a number of monetary-policy
tools available, such as interest rate cuts and lending facilities with low haircuts.
This paper studies the links between haircuts, required returns, and real activity, and
evaluates the dierent monetary policy tools theoretically and empirically. In a production
economy with multiple sectors nanced by agents facing margin constraints, we show that
binding constraints increase required returns and propagate business cycles. The central-
bank policy of reducing the interest rate decreases the required returns of low-haircut assets,
but may increase those of high-haircut assets, since it may increase the shadow cost of
capital for constrained agents. A reduction in the haircut of an asset unambiguously lowers
its required return, and can ease the funding constraints on all assets. Empirically, we
estimate that lowering haircuts through lending facilities signicantly decreased the required
return during the recent crisis, and we provide unique survey evidence suggesting a strong
demand-sensitivity to haircuts.
Our model features heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents who are limited to holding posi-
tions with total haircuts not exceeding the agents' capital. While this is a single funding
constraint, it aects securities dierently depending on their haircuts. This is the key fund-
ing constraint for real-world nancial institutions; for instance, Bear Stearns, Lehman, and
AIG collapsed when they could not meet their margin constraints.
In the model, risk-tolerant agents take leveraged positions in equilibrium, and, as we will
see, play a role that resembles that of the real-world nancial institutions described above.
When these leveraged agents' margin requirements become binding, their shadow cost of
capital increases, driving up equilibrium required returns, especially for high-haircut assets,
which use more of the now expensive capital. This mechanism lowers investment and output,
and leads to persistent eects of i.i.d. productivity shocks, thus exacerbating business cycle
swings, especially in high-haircut sectors. The margin-constraint business cycle is driven
by risk-tolerant agents' wealth as the key state variable, which falls whenever asset values
and labor income do. The consequences are disproportionately severe for the high-haircut
1To understand the meaning of a haircut, suppose that before the crisis a nancial institution could
borrow $98 with a $100 bond as collateral. The $2 dierence is the lender's extra margin of safety and is
called a 2% haircut. This allows the borrower up 50-to-1 leverage. If the haircut went to 20%, the institution
would need to nance $20 of the position with its own capital and could only support a 5-to-1 leverage.
2sectors because constrained investors reallocate capital towards assets that can be nanced
(i.e., leveraged) more easily.
Central banks often ght low real activity by reducing the interest rate to lower the
required return on capital. This policy, however, makes leveraged investing more attrac-
tive, thus possibly increasing the shadow cost of capital, which in turn my actually increase
the required return on high-haircut assets. Low-haircut assets' returns, on the other hand,
depend only weakly on the shadow cost of capital | the extreme case is that of an asset
with zero haircut, whose required return is driven purely by the interest rate and riskiness,
and independent of the state of the constraint | and therefore are brought down by re-
ducing interest rates. Naturally, decreases in required returns are accompanied by increased
investment and production, and vice-versa.
This observation motivates a natural policy question: What can be done when lowering
the interest rate does not help high-haircut sectors (or when the nominal interest rate is
already zero)? As Bagehot points out, the central bank can lend against a wide range of
securities and, we might add, at a modest yet prudent haircut. We show that if the central
bank decides to accept a particular security as collateral at a lower haircut than otherwise
available, this always lowers its required return. The required returns of other securities
either all increase or all decrease, depending on what happens to the shadow cost of capital.
The most intuitive case is that the shadow cost of capital decreases due to the new source
of funding, thus helping other securities as well, and we show that this happens when the
haircut is reduced suciently.
Further, the shadow cost of capital decreases if the haircut on enough securities can be
lowered. This observation is relevant for the debate about whether central banks should
extend their lending facilities to legacy securities or restrict attention to new issues. The
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program was initially focused on newly
issued securities, since these imply new credit provided to the real economy. Lowering the
haircut on these securities helps reduce their required returns, but does little to ease the
overall funding constraints in the nancial sector. The legacy TALF program applied to
existing securities and therefore had the potential to alleviate the funding problems more
broadly | and atten the haircut-return curve as a result.
As a nal theoretical result, we show that the shadow cost of capital can be reduced
through asset purchases or capital injections. Hence, these policy tools also lower required
returns and stimulate real activity, but they may be associated with signicant costs and
risks.
Empirically, we nd that central-bank-provided loans at modest haircuts can be a pow-
erful tool for lowering yields and stimulating economic activity. We arrive at this conclusion
by studying the introduction of the legacy TALF that provided loans with lower haircuts and
longer maturity than otherwise available. Yields went down signicantly when the TALF
program was announced, increased when Standard and Poor's (S&P) changed its ratings
methodology in a way that would make a number of securities ineligible for TALF, and
nally went down again, and further than before, when TALF was implemented. We note
that the yield of both TALF eligible and ineligible securities reacted to the news, consistent
3with the idea that the common shadow cost of capital was aected.
While suggestive, this string of yield reactions does not provide conclusive evidence,
since so many other things went on at the same time. We use two approaches to isolate
the eect of TALF: (1) We study evidence from a survey conducted in March 2009 (before
the legacy TALF was introduced) asking market participants the prices they would bid for
certain securities without TALF, with access to high-haircut term funding, and with access
to low-haircut term funding; and (2) We study the reaction of market prices, adjusting for
non-TALF eects by considering the price response to unpredictable bond rejections from
the TALF program.
The survey indicated that participants would pay 6% more for a super senior CMBS bond
if they had access to a 3-year loan with a high haircut than they would pay if they had no
access to term leverage. The bid price was higher for lower haircuts and longer maturities,
reaching 50% above the no-TALF bid for the longest-term loan with a low haircut. The
signicance of the eect is also apparent in terms of yields: Participants required a 15%
yield without access to term leverage (which was the yield prevailing in the market), but
their required bond yields drop to 12% with access to 3-year loans with a low haircut (similar
to what was actually implemented in TALF), and to 9.5% for 5-year loans. Hence, according
to this survey, low-haircut term leverage similar to TALF had the potential to lower yields
by 3-5% for super senior bonds.
These results are evidence of signicant demand sensitivity to haircuts. To make sure
that the higher bid reects the value of nancing, not the value of being able to default on
the loan, we focus on super-senior commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), as these
are the safest bonds. The participants in the survey were asked to estimate the losses on the
pool in a stress scenario, and, even in the stress scenario, the estimated losses on the pool
imply no losses on the safest super-senior tranches.
The survey evidence is corroborated by transaction-price data showing the eect of TALF
on actual bond yields, controlling for other eects. Indeed, we nd a statistically signicant
rise in the yield spread of bonds that are unexpectedly rejected from the TALF program by
the Fed, over and above the yield change of other bonds in the same security class during
the same week. In other words, the required return rises for bonds that fail to benet from
TALF's lower haircuts. As further evidence consistent with the model, we nd that this rise
in yield is greater during the early part of the program (July-September, 2009) when capital
constraints were more binding, than in the later period (October 2009-March 2010). During
the early period, we estimate that the a TALF rejection lead to an immediate 80 bps rise in
yield, with the eect eventually falling to 40 bps.
The eect of lowering haircuts during crises can likely far exceed the estimated 40 bps
long-term eect, for a couple of reasons. First, the economy and capital constraints had
already improved substantially during this early legacy TALF period relative to the height
of the crisis (e.g., March 2009 when the survey was conducted). Thus, the haircut eect
during the height of the crisis would likely have been signicantly larger. Second, we are
only measuring the eect of a bond's haircut on its own yield, not that of the lending program
on the liquidity in the system more broadly. In the language of our theory, we only estimate
4the eect of moving a bond along the haircut-return curve, not the attening of the curve
itself.
Our overall evidence suggests that the haircut tool is a powerful one, consistent with our
model. To put the magnitude in perspective, recall that the Fed lowered the Fed funds rate
from 5.25% in early 2007 all the way to the zero lower bound (0-0.25%), a 5% reduction.
Since we estimate that the haircut tool implemented with a program such as TALF can lower
yields by well in excess of 0.40%, perhaps up to 3-5% as our survey suggests, its eectiveness
appears economically signicant.
The estimated economic magnitude can be understood in the context of the model
as follows: Lowering the haircut by 80% lowers the required return by approximately
10%80%40%=3% if the shadow cost of capital was around 10% for the 40% of risk-bearing
capacity that were constrained during the crisis. With standard production functions, this
leads to large eects on investment, capital, and output in the aected sectors.
Our paper is related to several large literatures. Borrowing constraints of entrepreneurs
and rms aect business cycles and collateral values (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), Detemple and Murthy (1997), Geanakoplos (1997, 2003), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2005), Coen-Pirani (2005), and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008)).2
Rather than focusing on borrowers' \balance-sheet eects" (or \credit-demand" fric-
tions), we consider the lending channel (or \credit-supply" frictions), as Holmstr om and
Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000), and Ashcraft (2005). The impact on the macroe-
conomy of nancial frictions has been further studied recently by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008),
Adrian and Shin (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), C urdia
and Woodford (2009), Reis (2009), and Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2009). Also, Lorenzoni
(2008) shows that there can be inecient credit booms due to re-sale externalities with
credit constraints.
Our asset-pricing implications are related to Hindy (1995), Cuoco (1997), Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999), and especially G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2009). Required returns are also
increased by transaction costs and market-liquidity risk (Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
Longsta (2004), Due, G^ arleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007), Acharya and Pedersen (2005),
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), and He and Krishnamurthy (2008)). Market liq-
uidity interacts with margin requirements as shown by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
who also explain why margin requirements tend to increase during crises because of liquidity
spirals, a phenomenon documented empirically by Adrian and Shin (2008) and Gorton and
Metrick (2009a, 2009b).
We complement the literature by generating cross-sectional predictions in a multi-sector
model with credit supply frictions due to margin constraints, by showing how interest rate
cuts may be ineective for high-haircut assets during crises, and evaluating the eect of
another monetary tool | haircuts | theoretically and empirically.
Haircuts play a central role in the paper. One may wonder, however, whether this
2See also the related literatures in corporate nance and banking, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Holmstr om
and Tirole (1998, 2001), and Allen and Gale (1998, 2004, 2005).
5institutional feature is of passing importance. To the contrary, we would argue that loans
secured by collateral with a haircut have played an important role in facilitating economic
activity for thousands of years. For instance, the rst written compendium of Judaism's
Oral Law, the Mishnah, states:
\One lends money with a mortgage on land which is worth more than the value
of the loan. The lender says to the borrower, `If you do not repay the loan within
three years, this land is mine.'"3
| Mishnah Bava Metzia 5:3, circa 200 AD.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the model, Section 2 de-
rives the economic dynamics and eects of haircuts and interest rate cuts, Section 3 presents
the empirical evidence, and Section 4 concludes.
1 Model
We consider a simple overlapping-generations (OLG) economy where rms and agents inter-
act at times ..., -1, 0, 1, 2,... At each time t, J new young (representative) rms are started
and there are J old rms that were started during the previous period t   1. Old rm j
produces output Y
j
t depending on its capital K
j
t, labor use L
j
t, and productivity A
j
t, which


















t) is a Cobb-Douglas production function with +  1. The
productivity shocks A
j
t have mean  Aj and variance-covariance matrix A, assumed invertible.
Each type of rm uses its own specialized labor with wage w
j
t. Given the wage, rm j chooses






















Each young rm invests I
j
t units of output goods, which become as many units of capital




t. Capital cannot be redeployed once productivity shocks are
realized | in eect, it is specic to a type of rm (and depreciates fully each period as in
Bernanke and Gertler (1989)).4 The rm chooses investment to maximize its present value,
3The Talmud provides further detail on how the haircut should be treated in the event of default:
\Rav Huna: If this condition was made when the money was given, then it is binding, even if
the eld is worth more than the loan. If the condition was made after the money was given, then
the lender can only take the portion of the land equivalent to the value of the loan."
| Babylonian Talmud Bava Metzia 66a-66b.
4If depreciation is only partial and disinvestment is costless following production, then the results are
qualitatively the same.


















Each young rm j issues shares in supply j, which we normalize to j = 1 in most of the
paper. These shares represent a claim to the rm's prot  P
j
t+1 next period, t+1. The shares












. (Note that we use the notation P
j
t
for the price of a young rm at time t and  P
j
t+1 for the price of the same rm when old.) The
rm uses the proceeds from the sale to invest the I
j
t units of capital. The balance (which




t represents a prot to the initial owners of the
technology.
Each time period, young agents are born who live two periods. Hence, at any time,
the economy is populated by young and old agents. Agents dier in their risk aversion; in
particular, a agents have a high risk aversion a, while b agents have a lower risk aversion
b.
All agents are endowed with a xed number of units of labor for each technology and part
of the technology for new rms. Specically, a young agent (or \family") of type n 2 fa;bg
inelastically supplies n units of labor to each type of rms, where the total supply of labor
is normalized to 1, a + b = 1, and owns a fraction !n of each of the young rms. At time
t, a young agent n 2 fa;bg therefore has a wealth W n
t that is the sum of his labor income


















Agents have access to a linear (risk-free) saving technology with net rate of return rf and
choose how many shares  to buy in each young rm. Depending on an agent's portfolio
choice, his wealth evolves according to
Wt+1 = Wt(1 + r
f) + 
>(  Pt+1   Pt(1 + r
f)): (5)
Shares in asset j are subject to a haircut or margin requirement m
j
t, which limits the amount
that can be borrowed using one share of asset j as a collateral to P j(1 m
j
t). We can think
of haircuts/ margin requirements as exogenous or as set as in Geanakoplos (2003). Hence,











5Given that markets are incomplete, dierent types of agents may employ dierent pricing kernels, but
the homogeneity of the production function means that, since they agree on the current price of the rm,
they also agree on the optimal investment policy.








An equilibrium is a collection of processes for wages wt, investment It, stock prices Pt,
and pricing kernels t so that markets clear.
1.1 Haircuts, Credit Supply, and the Required Return
To solve for the equilibrium, we rst take the rms' investments as given and solve for the
agents' optimal portfolio choice and the equilibrium required return. Agent n's portfolio











where the variance-covariance matrix t = Vart(  Pt+1) is invertible in equilibrium (as shown
by (26) below.) The rst-order condition is
0 = Et(  Pt+1)   Pt(1 + r
f)   




t is a Lagrange multiplier for the margin constraint,7 and D() makes a vector into







t (Et(  Pt+1)   Pt(1 + r
f)    
n
t D(mt)Pt): (10)
We assume that we are in the natural case in which the risk-averse agent is unleveraged
and therefore has a zero Lagrange multiplier, i.e.,  a = 0. (This outcome arises naturally
with endogenous interest rates, see G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2009).) Let   =  b. The
market-clearing condition, namely











t (Et(  Pt+1)   Pt(1 + r





6The results do not rely on this utility function. Indeed, preferences are mainly used below to derive
the required return as a margin CAPM, and an almost identical margin CAPM relationship is derived with
constant relative risk aversion in continuous-time in G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2009). Further, Cuoco (1997)
derives a modied CAPM for general convex constraints and general preferences.
7Equation (9) holds if the optimal choice n is strictly positive, which appears the most natural case. We
state Proposition 1 under this assumption. In the appendix we provide the complete result.
8For any vector v 2 RJ, D(v) is a diagonal J  J matrix with (j;j) entry vj.










b, these calculations yield the equilibrium price
Pt = D(1 + r
f +  txmt)
 1  
Et(  Pt+1)    

: (14)
Prices can be translated into returns r
j




t  1, giving rise to a modied CAPM. To
state such a result, we let rmkt
t+1 = q>

















Proposition 1 (Margin CAPM) The required return on security j depends on its market









where the market risk premium is t = Et(rmkt










t is the margin
requirement on asset j, and  t is the shadow cost of agent b's margin constraint.
The positive relation between the required return and beta is a central principle in -
nance (called the \security market line"). With margin constraints, the required return also
depends on the margin requirement when constraints are binding, since the risk-tolerant
agents cannot hold as many securities as they would otherwise. Importantly, the eect of
the constraint diers in the cross-section of assets: Assets that have high haircuts/margins
use a lot of the investors' capital and, therefore, are associated with higher required returns.
Example. Figure 1 illustrates graphically the dependence of the required return on haircuts
(the \haircut-return line") when the constraint is slack, as well as when it binds. In the
former case, the haircut levels do not aect the required returns, but when the constraint
binds, i.e., during crises, the required return increases with the haircut.
In the following sections, we consider a number of other economic properties of the model
solved with the same parameters as those this gure is based on. The parameters are as
follows. All rms have production-function parameters  = 0:3 and  = 1    = 0:7, and
productivity shocks are identically distributed and independent with mean  A = 3:3 and
standard deviation 0.67. There are 40 rms with relatively low haircut levels (m = 0:1),
and 10 more rms with evenly spaced haircuts m 2 f0:1;0:2;:::;1g. We assume that the
absolute risk-aversion coecients of the two agents are a = 28:5 and b = 1:5. In the
\crisis" state, when b is constrained, his wealth is W b = 7:7, and the \non-crisis" state
captures any wealth level W b > 8:1. Finally, the base-case interest rate is rf = 0:02.


























Constraint does not bind
Constraint binds (crisis)
Figure 1: Required Return Increases in the Margin Requirement (or Haircut).
1.2 Investment, Income, and Output
Now we turn to the rm's optimal labor choice and investment. First, when the old rm j
optimizes over its labor choice L
j





















since it gives rise to a labor demand of L
j
t = 1. Importantly, a lower capital stock K | due
to a lower investment in the previous period | results in lower wages, a phenomenon that
plays an important role in the later analysis.
When young, the rm chooses its optimal investment I
j
t 1 in a competitive environment
and hence takes the wage at time t as given. Hence, to solve the young rm's investment
problem at time t   1, consider rst the optimal labor choice when the rm arrives at time
t with a capital of I
j
t 1, while wages are set based on capital at time K
j
t (due to the \other"












































Equation (16) shows that the prot is a fraction 1  of the output (due to the Cobb-Douglas


























































































A direct implication of (24) is that the rm's initial value (before the shares are issued) is
non-negative.
Investment decisions determine prots (i.e., the value of old rms), whose moments can
be calculated explicitly given that  P
j





















In turn, these moments determine the required return as discussed in Section 1.1. Hence,
combining (25){(26) with (14) gives the equation that determines investment:
(1 + r


















To see the intuition behind this formula, consider as an example the case when productivity








































Constraint does not bind
Constraint binds (crisis)
Figure 2: Less Real Investment in High-Haircut Sectors when Constraints Bind.
Naturally, investment increases with the expected productivity Et(A
j
t+1) and decreases with
productivity risk vart(A
j
t+1). Further, investment decreases when the required return is
elevated by   due to investors' binding margin constraint, especially for assets with high
margin requirements m
j
t. This cross-sectional eect is illustrated in Figure 2.
2 Haircuts, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy
We now turn to the equilibrium properties of the economy and the eects of monetary
policy. The model is set up to generate no business cycles in the absence of the credit
frictions. However, when the margin constraints of the risk-tolerant agents become binding,
required returns increase and business cycles arise.
Proposition 2 (Margin-Constraint Accelerator) Absent margin constraints, output is
independent over time. With margin constraints, output, income, investment, consumption,
wages, and required returns are correlated over time, due to the propagation of a productivity
shock suciently severe to make the risk-tolerant investors' margin requirement bind.
Margin-constraint-driven business cycles are propagated through the persistent eect on the
wealth of the risk-tolerant agents. The basic mechanism is that binding constraints raise
the required return, reducing real investment, which reduces the following period's expected
12output and income, which in turn makes the nancing constraint harder to satisfy, and so on.
As seen in Figure 3, lower real investment reduces labor income and the value of technologies,
leading to lower real investment in the future, until the risk-tolerant agents are recapitalized.
























Figure 3: Real Investment Following a Shock that Makes Margin Requirements Bind.
Next, we consider the eect of a reduction in interest rates. While, in New Keyensian
models, monetary policy acts through a reduction in the nominal interest rate, which in turn
reduces the real rate because of sticky prices, we take a short-cut and consider the eect of
reducing the real rate directly. To concentrate on the margin constraint as the only channel
through which dierent assets interact, we assume throughout this section that productivity
shocks are independent in the cross section and that the constraint is binding at time t. In
the interest of simplicity, we also make the usual assumption  +  = 1.
Proposition 3 (Interest-Rate Cuts) If type-a agents are suciently risk averse, then a
cut in the current interest rate increases the shadow cost of capital  t, increases the required
return of high-haircut assets, and lowers the real investment in high-haircut assets. More
precisely, there exists a cuto  mt with mini mi
t <  mt < maxi mi
t such that the required return
on asset i increases and the real investment Ii decreases if and only if mi
t >  mt.9
The eect of an interest-rate cut is illustrated in Figure 4. A reduction in the interest
rate lowers the required return for assets with low haircuts, but it increases the required
9More general results hold, but we omit them in the interest of simplicity.
13return for high-haircut assets. This outcome obtains because risk-tolerant investors' desire
for leverage increases with the lower interest rate, elevating the shadow cost of capital. The
higher shadow cost of capital increases the required return, and this eect overwhelms the
direct eect of the interest rate cut for high-haircut assets. As a result, the real investment
and output decrease in high-margin sectors.






























interest rate = 0.04
interest rate = 0.02
interest rate = 0.00
Figure 4: Interest Rate Cut: The Steepening of the Haircut-Return Relationship.
Hence, to increase investment and output in illiquid, i.e., high-haircut, sectors, a central
bank needs to either move them down the haircut-return curve, or atten the entire curve.
Said dierently, it needs to either (a) target these assets to make them more liquid, or (b)
improve the overall liquidity of the system:
Proposition 4 (Haircut Cuts) (a) If the margin requirement on asset j is reduced, then
the required return for that asset decreases and real investment in the asset increases. The
real investments in the other assets either all increase or all decrease.
(b) The required returns decrease and real investments increase for all assets if m
j
t is decreased
suciently or if the haircuts on suciently many assets are decreased by a given fraction.
Figure 5 illustrates the statement of this proposition. The margin constraint on one of
the assets is reduced from mj = 0:7 to mj = 0:5, which has two eects. First, if asset j
is innitesimal, aggregate quantities remain the same, but the required return on asset j
decreases (and investment increases) as it is moved down the haircut-return curve. Second,
the reduction in haircut relaxes | this is the typical outcome, although the converse is


























before asset−j haircut cut
after asset−j haircut cut
Figure 5: Haircut Cut for One Asset.
theoretically possible | the margin constraint of agent b, i.e., reduces his shadow cost of
capital  , which attens the haircut-return line, further reducing the required return for
asset j as well as that of other assets.
Proposition 4 is the central result that underlies our empirical tests. In the next section,
we nd that the haircut-return curve indeed attens when the central-bank lending facilities
are announced, which is consistent with part (b), and that a security's yield responds to
news about its central-bank provided haircut, consistent with part (a).
It is worth discussing why the central bank can provide loans at lower haircuts than
otherwise available in the market. This assumed ability rests on two premises: First, the
central bank is special in that it does not have a margin constraint | in contrast, it has a
unique access to money that it can lend during crises. Second, while haircuts must be large
enough to protect lenders from credit risk, the funding markets can be broken so badly in
crises | with market haircuts rising as high as 100% | and therefore, the central bank can
oer lower haircuts while taking little credit risk.
Just as is the case with productivity shocks covered by Proposition 2, the eects of pol-
icy intervention are persistent. For instance, reductions in the interest rate or in haircuts
change the real investment and therefore future labor income and investment. Indeed, low-
ering haircuts suciently or for suciently many assets increases output both in the current
and future time periods. These dynamic eects follow intuitively from the previous proposi-
tions, so let us instead end this section by considering the eects of capital injections in the
15institutions whose investment ability is constrained by margin requirements, or purchases of
assets in sectors in which the government wants to promote real investment.
Proposition 5 (Capital Injection and Asset Purchases) (a) If agent b's wealth is in-
creased, required returns go down and real investment increases for all assets.
(b) If the government buys shares in asset i, then the real investment in that asset increases
and the investments in all other assets either all increase or decrease. If the government
purchase is suciently large, then all real investments increase.
3 Haircuts and Prices: The Eect of TALF
Our theory suggests that the ability to borrow against securities plays an important role in
liquidity crises and their resolution. Consistent with this implication, central banks around
the world created a number of lending facilities to provide collateralized loans at lower
haircuts than otherwise available during a crisis (but often higher than the market-provided
haircut during good times).
The main lending facility in the U.S. is the Federal Reserve's Discount Window, which is
available only to banks with reserve accounts. The discount window can be used to supply
liquidity to banks in times of stress, enabling them to increase lending to the rest of the econ-
omy. However, during the crisis of 2007-2009 banks' own balance-sheet problems impaired
this transmission mechanism, and therefore the Fed introduced additional lending facilities,
including, for the rst time ever, facilities that were available more broadly to non-banks.
The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is a good example. TALF was put
in place in 2008 to provide loans against asset-backed securities (ABS) at a haircut, available
to any U.S. company or investment fund. The program was motivated by the credit-supply
frictions that we model:
\New issuance of ABS declined precipitously in September and came to a halt in October.
At the same time, interest rate spreads on AAA-rated tranches of ABS soared to levels well
outside the range of historical experience, reecting unusually high risk premiums. The ABS
markets historically have funded a substantial share of consumer credit and SBA-guaranteed
small business loans. Continued disruption of these markets could signicantly limit the
availability of credit to households and small businesses and thereby contribute to further
weakening of U.S. economic activity. The TALF is designed to increase credit availability
and support economic activity by facilitating renewed issuance of consumer and small busi-
ness ABS at more normal interest rate spreads." | Press Release, November 25, 2008,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
The original TALF was directed at lowering the haircut only on newly issued securities,
because these securities are related to the new loans provided to the real sector of the
economy. This makes it dicult to assess the price eect of the program since these yet-to-
be-issued securities were naturally not traded when the program was announced.
16TALF was later extended to legacy securities, that is, securities that had been issued
before 2009. The extension of TALF to legacy securities sought to reduce the liquidity
discount for these securities, improving the balance sheet of nancial institutions that held
them, and to lower the opportunity cost of making new loans. In the language of our model,
the new-issue TALF sought to move newly issued securities down the haircut-return curve,
while the legacy TALF sought to atten the curve itself (Proposition 4).
We next describe the events surrounding the introduction of the legacy TALF, and then
we test empirically its eect.
3.1 The Introduction of the Legacy TALF
The rst indication that the Federal Reserve would attempt to support the legacy CMBS
market was made in a joint announcement by the Federal Reserve and Treasury on March
19, 2009, suggesting that legacy CMBS with a current AAA rating and legacy RMBS with
an original AAA credit rating were being studied for inclusion in the TALF program. The
new-issue TALF program had its rst subscription on the same date, and provided investors
with term non-recourse leverage against eligible collateral in order to stabilize funding for
non-banks who relied on the term ABS market. The US Treasury also announced details
around the securities public-private investment program (PPIP), where the taxpayer would
take an equity stake in a joint venture with selected asset managers in order to purchase
legacy securities. As illustrated in Figure 6, CMBS prices rallied signicantly across the
capital structure, consistent with a attening of the haircut return curve (Proposition 4).
The vertical lines in the graph correspond to this key date as well as four others, summarized
below the graph.
On May 19, 2009 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conrmed that the legacy TALF
program would move forward for CMBS and released preliminary terms. In particular,
eligible collateral was limited to super senior xed-rate conduit CMBS bonds with a AAA
credit rating from at least two rating agencies and no lower rating. Despite the fact that the
program did not make junior AAA bonds eligible collateral, Figure 6 illustrates that spreads
for all original AAA bonds continued their rally following the announcement. This broad
eect is consistent with the TALF lowering the shadow cost of capital (  in our model) by
relieving nancial institutions' capital constraints as intended by the Fed.
On May 26, 2009, however, Standard and Poor's released a \Request for Comment" on
proposed changes to their rating criteria for xed-rate conduits. In the release, the rating
agency suggested that these changes would not only put junior AAA-rated bonds on negative
downgrade watch, but also a signicant fraction of super senior bonds just made eligible for
the TALF program. While the statement contained no new information about the credit
risk of the bonds (it was simply a change in ratings methodology), AAA CMBS spreads
retreated broadly following the announcement, since such a rating action would make the
bonds ineligible for TALF. Research groups aliated with CMBS dealers complained in their
weekly reports about the action, and encouraged the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
drop Standard and Poor's as a rating agency for the program.
On June 26, 2009 the rating agency went forward with its proposed changes to criteria,
17and put much of the xed-rate conduit universe on rating watch negative. Over 90 percent
of junior AAA bonds were placed on watch, and more than 20 percent of super senior bonds
were also placed on watch.
One week later, on July 2, the Federal Reserve announced the nal program details for
the legacy program, which had its rst subscription on July 16, 2009. These details claried
that investors would have to have acquired the bond in an arms-length transaction in the
30 days before the subscription date, a requirement meant to facilitate price discovery. In
addition to a standard three-year TALF loan maturity, the program permitted investors
to take out a ve-year loan, which was better suited to the longer-dated CMBS collateral.
However, the loans came with a carry cap that limited the amount of income that an investor
could receive immediately to ensure that the Federal Reserve was paid in full before investors
received one dollar of upside.
3.2 Price Sensitivity to Haircuts: New Survey Evidence
Figure 6 already provides suggestive evidence on the eect of TALF on market prices, but we
need a more rigorous approach to answering the central questions of whether TALF caused
yields to narrow and, if so, by how much. We rst examine unique survey data on these
specic questions, and next examine market prices.
In March 2009 a survey was conducted among market participants, including both in-
vestors and dealers, about how they would value term nonrecourse collateralized loans pro-
vided for the purchase of certain CMBS securities. The respondents indicated that lowering
haircuts could have a large eect on price and liquidity in the CMBS market. The price
eect could be driven by both the value of access to capital, consistent with our model, and
the participants' option to walk away from the loan. Since we are interested in the value of
access to capital, we focus on the safest securities, which, according to our estimates, had
very small risk on a hold-to-maturity basis.
These CMBS bonds are securities backed by a pool of commercial real-estate loans.
The cash ows from the securities are split into various tranches. We focus on the most
senior tranches, those that have priority in case there is not enough money to pay all the
tranches. In particular, we focus on the tranches that were rated AAA. Even within the AAA
securities, there are dierences in seniority, however. The most senior ones | the so-called
super-senior ones | are called A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, and A1A, the next most senior are called
AM (mezzanine within those originally rated AAA, but relatively senior more broadly), and
the least senior ones are called AJ (junior within AAA). The A1 and A2 receive cash ows
earlier than A3, A4, and A5, but have the same seniority, while A1A receive payments from
a dierent part of the pool as explained in more detail in Appendix A.
Losses in Stress Scenarios. Market participants were asked about their expectations
for credit loss in both a \base case" and \stress scenario," each dened by the respondent.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the participants' stress losses for each pool, illustrated
using a box plot. The top of each box is the 75th percentile, the bottom of the box is the
25th percentile, the middle line is the median, and the largest and smallest observation are
indicated with whiskers.
18The gure shows that the median market participants generally thought that pool stress
losses would be around 20%, and less than 10% for the MLMT pool. These overall pool
stress loses are small enough that the super senior CMBS bonds would avoid any losses.
Indeed, for the super senior bonds to incur losses, each pool must lose more than 30% of its
value, except the 2004 MLMT pool which was only subordinated at a 20% rate. (Given that
these loans often have recoveries of at least 50%, a 30% loss requires that more than 60%
of the pool ultimately default.) Focusing on the most pessimistic market participants, only
super senior bonds from the 2007 vintage seemed vulnerable to loss. (However, the gure
also illustrates that several of the AJ and AM bonds were at risk of loss in a stress scenario.)
Prices and Haircuts. The key part of the survey asked market participants the amount
they would bid for the bond without a Fed facility (their \cash bid"), the amount they would
bid under a number of alternative nancing arrangements, and their guess at the seller ask
price. In particular, the possible nancing arrangements in the survey were Fed-provided
collateralized loans with either a low or a high haircut (15 and 25 percent for super senior
bonds; 33 and 50 percent for other bonds) using a loan rate of swaps plus 100 basis points,
and loan maturity of 3 years, of 5 years, or matching the maturity of the bond.
Table 2 details the mean survey responses for each bond and our main nding is illustrated
more simply in Figures 8{11. In particular, Figure 8 shows the price of the super-senior (A4)
bonds. The x-axis has three dierent haircut options, from low to high: The low haircut
proposed in the survey, the high haircut in the survey, and the case of no TALF program
(i.e., the market-provided haircut, which is higher than the high survey haircut, often 100%
at that time, meaning that the collateral was not accepted, certainly at those maturities).
For simplicity, we normalize the prices by dividing by the no-TALF price (i.e. the cash bid).
This is illustrated for 3-year loans, 5-year loans, and maturity-matched loans (approximately
10 year loans).
We see that lower haircuts are associated with substantially higher prices, and, the longer
the loan, the larger the eect. With a 3-year loan with a high haircut, respondents say they
are willing to pay 6% more for these securities. If the haircut is lowered, their bid increases
to 18% over their cash bid, a strikingly large eect. If the loan is extended to 5 years, the
price premium increases to 33%, and a maturity-matched loan has a 51% premium. This
strong price sensitivity to the maturity of the loan is consistent with a fear of having to
renance the collateral in a bad market, which was expressed by the investors in follow-up
discussions.
These prices can also be expressed in terms of annualized yield to maturity as we do in
Figure 9. The average yield of these bonds was around 15% at the time of the survey (about
12% above the swap rate at that maturity). Having access to a 5-year term loan lowers the
yield to 11% with a high haircut, and to 9.5% at a low haircut. To put these numbers in
perspective, recall that during the crisis the Fed had lowered the Fed funds rate from 5.25%
in early 2007 all the way to the zero lower bound (0-0.25%). If the TALF could lower the
yields by several percentage points as our survey suggests, then it is a powerful tool.
Figure 10 shows that the eect of access to leverage is much stronger on the lower priced
AJ bonds. In some extreme cases, the bid price more than doubles with the TALF program
19relative to the bid price without it. This stronger eect could be due to the fact that these
bonds were even more dicult to nance in the market, or because of the value of walking
away from the loan.
To really focus on the shadow value of capital, Figure 11 plots the results for only
the safest super senior bonds, namely those that were signicantly over-collateralized, even
beyond the most pessimistic respondent's stress scenario. Taking the responses at face value,
this means that any losses on these bonds would be unlikely, and in the unlikely event of a
loss, recovery rates would likely be high.
We see that the price eect of lowering haircuts is large even in the case of the safest
super senior bonds, consistent with the program relieving a binding margin requirement
for nancial institutions. This interpretation is consistent with follow-up discussions with
market participants in which they described their methodologies. The typical rm used
discount rates over 20 percent even for risk-free cash ows that had to be completely funded
with the rm's own capital. Finally, Table 2 also shows that survey-based ask prices were
signicantly above cash bid prices, illustrating market illiquidity.
3.3 Do Haircuts Aect Market Prices?
Having established a strong link between haircuts and prices in survey data, we next consider
how market prices reacted to the program. As discussed above, yields narrowed signicantly
around the introduction of the program, but many other events occurred at the same time.
Hence, to assess the causality of haircuts on market prices, we apply a ner statistical tool.
Specically, we consider the market response to news that a bond is rejected from use in the
TALF program.
This strategy is based on the fact that TALF was available only for AAA-rated super-
senior bonds accepted by the Fed after a review of the credit risk of the loan. When a
bond was rejected, it would not benet from the program's low haircuts, and, therefore, our
model predicts that its yield should rise by an amount that is increasing in the shadow cost
of capital.
We note that the Fed's decision is unlikely to have conveyed private information about
the bonds. While the Fed employed outside vendors with expertise in commercial real estate,
the risk assessment process only used information available from publicly-available prices,
oering documents, and servicing reports.
The decisions to reject bonds was nevertheless news to the market, as market participants
were generally confounded by which bonds were rejected. For example, investment bank
research that discussed the ecacy of the risk-assessment procedures denoted the process as
a \black box" and, following the November subscription, Citi wrote \So once again we come
up short in trying to understand the Fed's rejection process."
To assess the impact of TALF eligibility, we run the following regression using weekly
data on yield spreads of approximately 1,600 super-senior xed-rate conduit bonds from
August 2008 through March 2010 with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and

















The dependent variable is each bond j's change in yield spread during week t, the c's are
regression coecients, and the explanatory variables are indicator functions for whether this
bond was rejected during the current week or any of the previous four weeks, indicator func-
tions for whether the bond was accepted during the same time periods, lagged yield changes,
and xed eects (fej;t) for each combination of week and security class. The interpretation
of the coecients on the rejection dummies is the eect of rejection on the change in yield
spread, over and above the general market yield changes for non-submitted bonds of that se-
curity class during that week (captured by the xed eects), and similarly for the acceptance
dummies.
Figure 12 shows the estimated response of spreads to being rejected or accepted from
the TALF program. We construct this graph by setting the initial yield spread to 300 bps
and then tracing the response to a TALF decision by iterating (29) using the estimated
coecients. The initial response to a rejection is a statistically signicant rise in the yield
spread by over 20 bps, and this eect is reduced to 3 bps over time. The larger initial eect
could be due to price pressure associated with selling by agents who will only hold the bonds
if they can get access to leverage. In contrast, the eect of TALF acceptance is only about
5 bps and appears mostly temporary. The larger eect of rejection can be explained by the
fact that only a small fraction of bonds were rejected (between 1% and 10%, except in the
last weeks of the program), so a rejection is more surprising.
The model implies that nancing terms (i.e., access to low haircuts) are more important
when the shadow cost of capital is high, i.e., during times of binding capital constraints. To
investigate this implication, Figure 13 considers the eect of TALF rejections separately for
the early sub-sample (July 2009 through September 2009) and the late sub-sample (October
2009 through March 2010) by estimating (29) separately for each period. The early period
includes what appeared to be the end of the 2007-2009 U.S. banking crisis, while banks and
the economy were doing better in many respects during the later period (e.g., lower TED
spreads, rising stock market, etc.).
Figure 13 shows that the eect of TALF rejections was much larger in the early period.
During the early period, a rejection was followed by a statistically signicant 80 bps increase
in yield spreads, and the eect eventually went down to about 40 bps. During the later
sample, the impact of a rejection was smaller and more transitory, with an immediate impact
of only 15 bps. Hence, it appears that the legacy TALF program had a signicant impact on
CMBS spreads, at least for the rst three months of the program, when capital constraints
were still tight. As liquidity returned to the markets, the liquidity provided by the program
became less important. The dependence of the rejection eect on liquidity provides another
argument against that the rejection eect was driven by information.
214 Conclusion: Two Monetary Tools
We model how required returns increase when credit-suppliers hit their margin constraints,
reducing economic activity and propagating business cycles. The eect is largest for illiquid
assets that are dicult to nance in a crisis, that is, assets with high haircuts.
Surprisingly, while an interest rate cut reduces the required return for liquid low-margin
assets, it can increase the required return for illiquid high-margin assets. This is because the
lower interest rate increases the desire for leverage and, as a result, increases the shadow cost
of capital. This eect increases the required return for high-margin assets, countervailing
the direct eect of the interest rate cut.
A haircut cut, on the other hand, always reduces the required return on the aected
asset and stimulates real activity in that sector. This can be achieved if the central bank
accepts such securities as collateral in exchange for loans. Hence, haircuts provide a second
monetary policy tool in addition to the standard interest-rate tool.
While haircuts can be decreased in crises by oering loans at moderate haircuts, they
cannot be similarly increased in good times when credit might be excessive. Indeed, if
a central bank oers collateralized loans at high haircuts, borrowers can simply get their
loans elsewhere. However, in addition to the market-imposed margin constraints, nancial
institutions also face regulatory capital requirements that can be captured in our framework
in a straightforward way.10 Hence, to reduce business cycles, a central bank may need capital
requirements in good times and lending facilities that stand ready in periods of liquidity crisis.
We examine empirically the eectiveness of the second monetary tool, studying the nat-
ural experiment of the introduction of the TALF lending facility. We nd strong eects of
providing collateralized loans at low haircuts. Survey evidence shows that yields on aected
securities might drop as much as 5% during the height of the crisis, illustrating a signicant
demand-sensitivity to haircuts.
We also consider the eect on actual market prices of TALF. To isolate the eect of
TALF, we estimate the change in yield following the Fed's unpredictable announcement of
a bond's acceptance or rejection from the program. The yield spread of rejected bonds rises
signicantly relative to other bonds, and the rejection eect is largest during crisis times
when the shadow cost of capital is high.
This approach estimates the eect of moving certain securities down the haircut-return
curve (Figure 5) by reducing their haircuts. Another important potential benet of lend-
ing programs is that they can reduce the required compensation for tying up capital more
broadly, i.e., attening the haircut-return curve (Figure 5 and Proposition 4) because the
program improves the funding conditions of constrained agents. Consistent with this con-
sideration, the yields on both aected and unaected securities went down when it was an-










t is the regulatory capital requirement for security i.
22nounced that legacy TALF was being considered, down when legacy TALF was conrmed,
up when a rating-methodology change made TALF less applicable, and nally down when
TALF was actually implemented.
The total eect of the haircut tool is thus to move securities down the haircut-return
curve and to atten the curve itself, reducing the yield on securities, which in turn improves
the credit supply to the real economy. In the data, as in the model, this monetary tool
appears to be eective during crises.
23A Appendix: Background on CMBS Securities
CMBS bonds are securities backed by a pool of commercial real estate loans. The cash ows
from the securities are split into various tranches. We focus on the most senior tranches,
those that have priority in case there is not enough money to pay all the tranches. In
particular, we focus on the tranches that were originally rated AAA (and, as we will see,
continued to be rating AAA for the most part). Even within the AAA securities, there are
dierences in seniority, however. The most senior ones | the so-called super-senior ones |
are called A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A1A, the next most senior are called AM (mezzanine
within AAA, but relatively senior more broadly), and the least senior ones are called AJ
(junior within AAA). The A1 and A2 receive cash ows earlier than A3 and A4, but have
the same seniority, while A1A receive payments from a dierent part of the pool as explained
below.
The real estate loans in the pool underlying xed-rate conduit CMBS have a xed interest
rate, a maturity of 5, 7, or 10 years, and amortization schedule over 30 years (implying a
principal payment at maturity). The loan pool typically includes more than 100 loans, but
the largest 10 loans can represent 40 percent of the overall balance. While the pool can
be diversied by geography and property type, given the balloon nature of the loans there
is correlated renancing risk. The so-called super-senior tranches generally had 30 percent
subordination at issue in the most recent vintages (i.e. starting in 2005), but had as little
as 20 percent subordination in earlier vintages. In contrast, the AM and AJ tranches, each
which also had AAA ratings at issue, only had 20 percent and 12 percent subordination,
respectively. These bonds have structural leverage given their subordination to the super
senior class, which makes it possible for investors to incur losses of 100 percent.
The loan pool underlying xed-rate conduit CMBS is often tranched into one pool of
multi-family loans and another pool of all other loans. Principal payments from the multi-
family loans are directed to the A1A tranche. Given the involvement of the GSEs in agency-
sponsored multi-family CMBS issue, it should not be surprising that loans in this pool are
generally adversely selected from the multi-family universe. Cash ows from other property
types (oce, retail, industrial, etc.) are directed to sequential-pay super senior classes, which
generally included A1, A2, A3, and A4. Upon receipt, principal is rst distributed to the A1
tranche until it paid in full, and then to the A2 tranche. This time-tranching makes the A1
and A2 bonds have shorter average lives (5 years) and the A3 and A4 bonds longer average
lives (10 years). Despite the time tranching, all of these bonds are structurally senior. In
particular, if credit losses on the overall loan pool rise above 30 percent, the allocation of
losses and principal from that point in time goes pro-rata among the super senior tranches.
The survey instrument focused on AAA-rated tranches from ve xed-rate conduit CMBS
deals illustrated in Table 1.
24B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the constraint (6), the rst-order condition for the
portfolio choice is
0 = Et(  Pt+1)   Pt(1 + r
f)   







t = 1 if i > 0, y
n;i
t =  1 if i < 0, and y
n;i
t 2 [ 1;1] if i
t = 0. Under the
assumption that W a is suciently large, agent a is unconstrained, i.e.,  a
t = 0, and equating












































Combining (B.3) and (B.4) yields the result in the proposition, given that yi
t = 1 8i;t.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let  W b denote the wealth invested by agent b in the risky assets
when not constrained. If the realization of the productivity vector At is low enough, then
W b
t <  W b, i.e., agent b becomes constrained and the investment level changes. (According to
Proposition 5, investment actually decreases, in all sectors, under the additional assumptions
that A is diagonal and  +  = 1.) Consequently, the reduced output due to the low
productivity shock predicts a level of output dierent from the average output.
The proofs of Propositions 3-5 are based on the following three equilibrium restrictions:
The optimality of aggregate demand (Equation (12)), the rst order condition for agent a's






















































t = 0, in addition to the restriction yi
t 2 [ 1;1]. Comparing (B.5) and (B.6) shows that,
11We use the notation  b =   and yb = y.
25since a > , yi
t > 0: otherwise 
i;a
t <  i
t, i.e., 
i;b
t > 0, which means yi
t > 0 | this would be
a contradiction. Note the implication that there is no shorting in equilibrium.
If i;b > 0 for all i, then we have a system of J + J + 1 equations, to be solved for
the same number of unknowns, namely agent a's security positions (1;a;:::;J;a), the rms'
investments (I1;:::;IJ), and the shadow cost of capital  . We have eliminated agent b's







t from Equation (24). The same conclusion holds in general, noting
that for every i such that b;i = 0 an unknown yi is introduced.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose rst a = 1, i.e., agent b is the sole investor in risky
assets. A decrease in r
f
t must be accompanied by increases in Ii
t for some i and decreases
for other i, in order to preserve the satisfaction of the margin constraint (B.7). Ii
t decreases,
however, if and only if r
f
t +  tmi
t increases. It follows that  t increases, and that r
f
t +  tmi
t
increases if and only if mi
t is large enough. Reasoning by continuity, we infer that the results
hold also when the risk tolerance (a) 1 is close enough to zero.
A more general result can be derived. In particular, for any value a, it holds that,
if 
i;b
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Proof of Proposition 4. (a) Suppose rst that 
j;b





t )Ii increases for some i, so that Ii increases. If i 6= j, Equation (B.5) then implies
that  t decreases, so that Ii
t increases for all i such that 
i;b
t > 0. In the case 
i;b
t = 0, Ii may
only increase, since 
i;b




t decreases for all i 6= j, 
i;b
t > 0, which implies that  t increases, then it must be the
case that either I
j
t increases (and therefore  tm
j
t decreases), or Ii
t with 
i;b
t = 0 increases.
The latter is impossible, though, since it requires that  tmi
tyi
t decreases, while  t increases,
as does yi
t (from some value in [ 1;1] to 1, since 
i;a




t becomes strictly positive).
Suppose now that 
j;b
t = 0. Then either the decrease in m
j
t has no impact, or 
j;b
t becomes
strictly positive, while Ij increases. The eect on Ii
t for i 6= j is as above.
(b) Suppose rst that j;b > 0. If m
j
t becomes 0, then (1 
j;a
t )Ii increases for some i 6= j,
which, following the rst steps above, leads to a decreased  t and higher investment in all
assets. If, on the other hand, 
j;b
t = 0, then I
j
t clearly increases, while all other investments
are unaected.
Finally, if all haircuts mi
t are lowered by the same fraction  2 (0;1), then some product
(1   
i0;a
t )Ii0 increases, so that  tm
i0
t decreases, which implies that  tmi
t decreases for all i.
Proof of Proposition 5. (a) Equation (B.7) implies that an increase in W b must be
accompanied by a decrease in i;a or an increase in Ii for some i. Equation (B.6) implies
that i;a and Ii are negatively related to each other, so that, for some i, both i;a decreases
and Ii increases.
26Finally, from (B.5) it follows that the increase in Ii must be oset by a decrease in  .
For all j 6= i with j;b > 0, therefore, Ij must also increase. If j;b = 0, then Ij does not
change as long as j;b does not.
(b) If  i goes down, then either i;a or i;b must decrease. If i;a decreases, then Ii must
increase (by (B.6)). If i;b decreases, then either Ii increases or j;bIj increases for some j 6= i.
In this case, then, Ij increases, and therefore   decreases, which implies that i;b increases,
which is a contradiction. We conclude that Ii increases. Note that investments in the other
technologies either all increase or all decrease. If  i becomes 0, then j;bIj increases for some
j 6= i, so that   must decrease, implying that Ij increases for all j with j;b > 0.
C Appendix: Data sources
The survey was conducted by one of the authors in mid-March 2009 of eight market partic-
ipants, including CMBS dealers as well as money managers who traded CMBS.
The econometric analysis exploits a proprietary data set on end of week prices for more
than 2,000 originally-rated AAA tranches of the outstanding xed-rate conduit universe for
2009, as well as credit ratings actions on those tranches for the same time period.
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A-4 46627QBA5 6/12/2043 7.08 5.81 Aaa AAA NR Perf 6.64 1.78 30.00 30.44
AM 46627QBC1 6/12/2043 7.23 5.86 Aaa AAA NR Perf 6.64 1.78 20.00 20.30
AJ 46627QBD9 6/12/2043 7.24 5.89 A2 AAA NR Perf 6.64 1.78 12.25 12.43
APB 9297667F4 10/15/2044 2.89 5.17 Aaa AAA AAA Outperf 1.36 0.00 30.00 35.14
A-4 9297667G2 10/15/2044 5.88 5.21 Aaa AAA AAA Outperf 1.36 0.00 30.00 35.14
AM 9297667J6 10/15/2044 6.50 5.21 Aaa AAA AAA Outperf 1.36 0.00 20.00 23.43
AJ 9297667K3 10/15/2044 6.56 5.21 Aaa AAA AAA Outperf 1.36 0.00 13.38 15.67
A-2 22544QAB5 6/15/2039 3.06 5.72 Aaa NR AAA Perf 2.04 0.94 30.00 30.07
A-4 22544QAE9 6/15/2039 8.01 5.72 Aaa NR AAA Perf 2.04 0.94 30.00 30.07
AM 22544QAG4 6/15/2039 8.16 5.72 Aaa NR AAA Perf 2.04 0.94 20.00 20.05
AJ 22544QAH2 6/15/2039 8.16 5.72 A1 NR AAA Perf 2.04 0.94 12.50 12.53
A-2B 12513YAC4 12/11/2049 2.76 5.21 Aaa AAA AAA Perf 3.69 3.42 30.00 30.10
A-3 12513YAD2 12/11/2049 4.82 5.29 Aaa AAA AAA Perf 3.69 3.42 30.00 30.10
A-4 12513YAF7 12/11/2049 7.63 5.32 Aaa AAA AAA Perf 3.69 3.42 30.00 30.10
AMFX 12513YAH3 12/11/2049 7.83 5.37 Aaa AAA AAA Perf 3.69 3.42 20.00 20.06
AJ 12513YAJ9 12/11/2049 7.90 5.40 A1 AAA/*- AAA Perf 3.69 3.42 11.13 11.16
A-2 59022HEU2 10/12/2041 0.46 4.07 NR AAA AAA Outperf 0.44 0.00 20.00 21.00
A-3 59022HEV0 10/12/2041 2.47 4.47 NR AAA AAA Outperf 0.44 0.00 20.00 21.00
A-5 59022HEX6 10/12/2041 5.40 4.86 NR AAA AAA Outperf 0.44 0.00 20.00 21.00
AJ 59022HFT4 10/12/2041 5.57 4.92 NR AAA AAA Outperf 0.44 0.00 12.38 13.00 3.16 6.58
13.47 24.24


















Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the CMBS securities used in the survey. These statistics
are as of the time of the survey in March 2009.













A-4 61.97 56.96 62.75 70.84 74.43 82.23 84.79 92.51
AM 42.14 33.69 34.12 45.39 37.97 51.12 49.18 63.04
AJ 25.07 21.03 24.72 30.40 27.32 39.12 31.44 44.79
APB 86.33 84.81 88.60 92.14 88.51 93.14 90.55 95.15
A-4 76.48 73.58 72.00 77.09 80.81 85.95 86.57 92.51
AM 54.10 46.41 46.04 52.61 51.53 59.41 63.62 72.05
AJ 40.42 34.82 33.94 43.31 38.06 48.33 47.27 60.42
A-2 77.45 73.83 84.57 89.40 85.35 90.08 88.04 92.56
A-4 58.39 52.94 59.31 66.79 69.71 76.35 81.27 89.68
AM 39.99 31.02 34.79 39.39 39.81 44.31 47.24 60.42
AJ 22.03 17.77 22.90 28.14 26.04 31.07 29.70 43.40
A-2B 78.75 76.63 85.30 88.56 85.55 89.11 88.52 93.32
A-3 66.28 61.58 74.78 80.08 81.07 86.79 85.89 91.61
A-4 62.55 57.40 62.37 68.74 70.26 75.88 80.89 88.37
AMFX 41.47 33.20 35.03 39.81 41.37 44.94 49.38 59.05
AJ 23.84 19.99 23.21 28.87 26.63 33.02 30.37 43.62
A-2 95.91 96.86 95.20 96.05 92.46 94.11 93.65 95.06
A-3 84.31 84.27 87.35 90.68 86.39 89.27 88.84 92.35
A-5 77.91 76.04 77.60 80.83 82.54 86.80 85.30 90.55
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Super Senior Tranche AJ Tranche
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Figure 6: The yield spread on super senior CMBS bonds, riskier mezzanine AM bonds, and
even more junior AJ bonds. The vertical lines represent the key announcement dates listed
below:
Date Announcement
11/25/2008 Initial TALF for ABS, suggesting possible expansion for CMBS
3/19/2009 Legacy securities will be part of TALF
5/19/2009 Super senior legacy xed-rate conduit CMBS eligible for TALF
5/26/2009 S&P considers methodology change for xed-rate conduit CMBS
6/26/2009 S&P implements new methodology
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Stress Case Projected Loss
Figure 7: Distribution of survey responses regarding the potential stress loss of each CMBS
pool. In this box plot, the top of each box is the 75% percentile, the bottom of the box is
the 25% percentile, the middle line is the median, and the largest and smallest observation














































Figure 8: The gure shows the average survey bid price of super senior CMBS A4 bonds
by haircut group. The participants bid the highest price if they have access to a TALF loan
with a low-haircut TALF, lower if the TALF loan has a high haircut, and lowest if they
don't have access to TALF. All prices are normalized by the no-TALF price. The three lines


















Figure 9: The gure shows the annual yields corresponding to the average survey bid price
of super senior CMBS A4 bonds by haircut group. The yield (i.e., the required return) is
lowest with a TALF loan with a low-haircut TALF, higher if the TALF loan has a high
haircut, and highest if there is no TALF. The three lines correspond to a 3-year TALF loan,













































Figure 10: The gure shows the average survey bid price of CMBS AJ bonds by haircut
group. The participants bid the highest price if they have access to a TALF loan with a
low-haircut TALF, lower if the TALF loan has a high haircut, and lowest if they don't have
access to TALF. All prices are normalized by the no-TALF price. The three lines correspond
to a 3-year TALF loan, a 5-year TALF loan, or a maturity-matched TALF loan (longest).












































Figure 11: The gure shows the average survey bid price of the safest super senior CMBS
A4 bonds by haircut group. The participants bid the highest price if they have access to a
TALF loan with a low-haircut TALF, lower if the TALF loan has a high haircut, and lowest
if they don't have access to TALF. All prices are normalized by the no-TALF price. The











- 4 - 3 - 2 - 10123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2





















Figure 12: The price eect of TALF rejections. This gure shows the yield-spread response
of CMBS bonds that are accepted or rejected from the TALF program. The yield spread of
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Figure 13: The price eect of TALF rejections by sub-sample. This gure shows the yield-
spread response of CMBS bonds that are rejected from the TALF program for, respectively,
the period from July to September 2009 (the ending of the nancial crisis) and from October
2009 to March 2010 (when the banking crisis was mostly over). The eect of rejections is
signicantly larger in the former period, consistent model's prediction that haircuts have a
larger eect on prices when capital constraints are tight and the shadow cost of capital is
high.
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